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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Duralith Corp.,'9 where the plaintiff attempted to show reliance on the mis-
representation of the defendants' agent, even though the contract expressly
provided, and plaintiff knew, that the agent lacked authority to make the
representation, that where a person has read and understood the disclaimer
of representation clause, he is bound by it. The disclaimer, when specific, has
then been deemed sufficient to constitute notice, and a subsequent change of
mind will not alter its effect.
A contrary decision by the court would have deprived the parties of
their freedom to determine, through negotiations, at the most suitable time, the
terms of their contract, for if the language used here was not capable of pre-
venting a party from claiming reliance, then no language could2 0
PREREQUiSiF Tw-mn-PARTY APPRovAL.
It is recognized in New York that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 1 It also appears that in con-
tracts made expressly subject to the approval of a third party there is an im-
plied duty upon the promisor to exercise reasonable efforts in seeking that
approval. Prior to Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.22 there appear to be no
New York cases dealing with the amount of effort necessary to meet this
requirement.
In the Wiesner case, a lessee, member of a co-operative apartment house,
contracted to assign her lease to plaintiff, subject to the approval of the
corporate owner. According to the corporation's by-laws such approval could
be obtained in three ways: (1) by a resolution of the board of directors, (2)
by written consent of a majority of the directors, (3) or, by written consent
of two-thirds of the shareholders. At a meeting of the board of directors the
requested approval was refused and the lessee notified the plaintiff of its
election to treat the contract as null and void. Plaintiff brought an action for
specific performance and moved for an injunction pendente lite. Before such an
injunction can issue plaintiff must establish a cause of action.
The Appellate Division was of the opinion that there was a cause of
action,23 holding that there was a question as to whether or not the lessee had
used reasonable efforts in seeking the required approval. It based its holding
largely on the fact that the lessee had not, until the action was before the
Appellate Division, sought to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the
19. 270 N.Y. 165, 200 N.E. 683 (1936).
20. The plaintiff buyer brought suit alleging misrepresentations concerning operation
expenses, and the contract proclaimed, "The Seller has not made and does not make any
representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation . . . except
as herein specifically set forth, and the Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledges that no
such representations have been made . . . and that the same (the contract] is entered
into after full investigation, neither party relying upon any statement or representation,
not embodied in the contract, made by the other."
21. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 57 N.E. 174 (1939).
22. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
23. 7 A.D.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1959).
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shareholders.24
The Court of Appeals reversed.25 It was satisfied that neither the law nor
the terms of the contract obligated the defendant to persuade the corporation
to approve the assignment. It also said that there was no question of the
right of the corporation to exclude the plaintiff, since this action was not
based upon a New York statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operative
housing.26
This case indicates that the duty to use reasonable efforts in seeking ap-
proval in third-party approval contracts may be minimal in New York if
such appears to be the parties' intention. Moreover, the effect of this case
is limited by its procedural setting. The instant case arose on a motion for
a temporary injunction, which would issue only if the plaintiff established a
cause of action for specific performance. Even if there was no reasonable effort
on the part of the lessee to seek approval, the Court could not issue the
injunction, because plaintiff's remedy would be an action at law for damages.
Even by court order an assignment would be ineffectual if the corporation
did not approve. In light of this procedural setting, and because the tenor
of the contract indicated that no obligation to seek approval was intended,
this decision is of minor importance.
STAY OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WHERE CONTRACT CALLS FOR ARBITRATION
Section 1450 of the Civil Practice Act 2 7 provides that the court, upon
application of one of the parties, shall order parties to proceed to arbitration
if their contract is established and has provided for that remedy.
Where the' contract provides for arbitration the courts relegate to the
exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration all acts of the parties subsequent to the
making of the contract,2 8 even if the contract was terminated before its
completion by breach29 or otherwise.30 No waiver of the right to arbitrate oc-
curs when a party moves for dismissal of a court action brought by the other
party,31 unless the party assents to the court's jurisdiction and fails to assert
24. The Appellate Division considered an attempt by the defendant to seek approval
by this method, while the case was before it, as immaterial since the issues were formed
at trial.
25. Supra note 22.
26. See, for example N.Y. Cvn RUHTS LAW § 18-a(2), which provides: "The
practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry in
any publicly assisted housing accommodations is hereby declared to be against public
policy."
27. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1450 provides: A party aggrieved by failure ... of another
to perform under a contract . . . providing for arbitration . . . may petition . .. for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in manner provided for in such contract....
Upon being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the contract
. . . or the failure to comply therewith, the court hearing such application shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
contract.
28. In re Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942).
29. In re Potoker, 2 N.Y.2d 553, 161 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1957).
30. Arbitration between Baker and Bd. of Educ., 309 N.Y. 551, 132 N.E.2d 837 (1956).
31. Haupt v. Rose, 265 N.Y. 108, 191 N.E. 853 (1934).
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